

FOCUS On Broadband Wireless Internet Access

ISSN: 1536-7215

Independent, Original, In-depth coverage of the trends and technology shaping the rapidly-evolving Broadband Wireless Internet Access industry

Recipient of Part-15.Org's 2002 Wireless Advocate Of The Year Award

Steve Stroh, Editor

Issue 2003-4, June 17, 2003

In this issue:

\* National Broadband - First National Fiber Optic / Broadband Wireless Internet Access Hybrid Service Provider

\* BWIA-related Events Of Note

--- \* National Broadband - First National Broadband Wireless Internet Access / Fiber Optic Hybrid Service Provider ---

National Broadband (<http://www.nationalbroadband.com>) is (as far as I'm aware) the first company to attempt to provide semi-national service using a combination of fiber-optic network backhaul and Broadband Wireless Internet Access "last few miles" connectivity to its customers. While National Broadband has, on the surface, considerable potential, there are a number of troubling aspects lurking in the background. National Broadband was officially unveiled at the recently concluded Broadband Wireless World Forum 2003 conference in San Jose, CA in April, 2003, with an earlier "soft launch" at WISPCON III in Chicago in March, 2003.

#### Part 1 - The Rise Of The Stupid Network and The Paradox Of The Best Network

To really understand, deeply, the potential and the peril of National Broadband, a bit of background reading is required. From his seminal essay "The Rise Of The Stupid Network" - <http://www.rageboy.com/stupidnet.html>, David Isenberg - <http://www.isen.com>, has thought longer and deeper about what is the essence of the Internet than anyone else I'm aware of. Isen's premise (I STRONGLY encourage reading The Rise Of The Stupid Network, and not just once, but several times... but most won't, hence this summary) in TROTSN is that the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) has grown so complex, extensive, and inflexible that for truly new services to be added requires that all the elements of the network be upgraded before any truly new service could be offered. Because it's no longer economically feasible to upgrade the entire PSTN, the PSTN is obsolete. Isen goes on to point out that the true genius of the Internet is that it is a highly simplistic (Stupid... in his parlance) network that at its core, does only one thing, and does it very well - routes packets from source to destination. New services can be added to a Stupid Network by creating them at the EDGES of the network - between as few as two users, or as many as an entire enterprise. Want to offer a new service? Post the software, users download it and thus equip themselves for the new service, and since it's "just more bits", the Internet / Stupid Network accommodates the new services seamlessly. The Rise Of The Stupid Network explains WHY services such as ICQ, Vonage, RealAudio, Peer-to-Peer file exchange can evolve so easily on the Internet, and will continue to do so in the future... dooming any hope of "stability", "standards", "installed base", etc. being nearly as potent an anti-competitive weapon by incumbents, as has been the case in the past.

The Rise Of The Stupid Network explains why the Internet is so good. The Paradox Of The Best Network - <http://www.netparadox.com/> explains why it's going to be so hard to make money at the business of supplying Stupid Network services. TPOTBN is also highly-recommended reading, but to summarize, the Paradox is that a Stupid Network will be a very tough business because what you're providing is absolute COMMODITY services - "just route the bits... just ROUTE the bits... just ROUTE the BITS... (repeat). Not only is it a low-margin business (just ROUTE the BITS... remember the value-added services live at the EDGE of the network, and you're just ROUTING the BITS), but every competitor that comes into the market can take advantage of state-of-the-moment better, cheaper, faster technology courtesy of Moore's Law now being relentlessly applied to telecommunications. So, "Stupid Network Services" (now THAT's a gutsy name for a Internet Service Provider... but expect to pay a small royalty to Isenberg) is something of a race to the bottom; a relentlessly cutthroat

competition to provide the best bit/buck ratio, making the hypercompetitive disk drive and Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) industries look like mere friendly jousting.

The only way to make money as a provider of "Stupid Network Services" is to provide value add where you can, inexpensively... like high reliability, open peering policies, good customer service, reasonable billing practices, and of course, lower prices. While that's some differentiation at the moment in a market dominated with wireline telephony companies whose core competencies can best be described as "service with a sneer" and "what-can-we-stick-you-with" pricing, soon enough those policies will be more the norm. The core competency of a "Stupid Network Services" provider will be to realize, accept, and INTERNALIZE that they are truly in a low-margin commodity business and to engineer the business around that reality. That means being relentlessly cost-efficient and proactive on pricing and performance. Most of all, a "Stupid Network Services" provider must be maniacally focused on JUST ROUTE THE BITS and not be distracted by "opportunities" (particularly when they're costly in time, manpower, or finances) or tempted to "lock in" the customer by implementing proprietary or special services.

Between The Rise Of The Stupid Network and The Paradox Of The Best Network is a blueprint for a new generation of infrastructure communications services. There won't be many that take advantage of such an "opportunity"; the essays make it clear that such a business will be a hard way to make money, and the money that there is to be made will be considerably less than other "opportunities" such as providing content, etc.

A number of entities - Municipal governments, rural electric co-ops, homeowner's associations, not-for-profit groups have decided that high-speed Internet access is, simply, the next utility service and should be provided essentially at cost - as is done now with electricity, water, sewer, etc. - vital services, but not much money (in some markets) to be made. Note that in providing Stupid Network Services, there is ample opportunity for value add by private entities; two examples are web hosting and email.

One of the most challenging aspects of a "Stupid Network Services" provider is connecting to customers. A "Stupid Network Services" financial model simply doesn't permit the luxury of payments to others for the privilege of connecting to a customer; if you can't connect with your own facilities, then they aren't a real customer.

Which brings us to yet another Paradox - let's call it "The Paradox Of Facilities-based Networks", which is that "Stupid Network Services" ONLY work when you're not paying someone else for the privilege of connecting to your customer... but it's near RUINOUSLY expensive to build your own Network.

Which is why those who've tried have almost all failed.

But there IS a way...

Where fiber has been installed AND is cheap and/or competitive (or can install it at REASONABLE cost AND REASONABLE timelines), use that fiber. Fiber that's installed and paid for (even if it was bought in a bankruptcy) is the very best, ever, bit/buck Internet connectivity.

But... where you DON'T have fiber, or cannot install it at REASONABLE cost or REASONABLE timelines, use Broadband Wireless Internet Access to bridge between the fiber and your customer (with preference for LICENSE-EXEMPT Broadband Wireless Internet Access.)

That last run-on sentence is a wrenching turn off the freeway of conventional telecommunications wisdom onto a narrow, rocky, fit-only-for-mules path of out-of-the-box thinking. I'm aware of only two companies who have semi-successfully combined Broadband Wireless Internet Access and fiber backbone... and many who've dismissed it as unrealistic fantasy or completely unworkable.

## Part 2 - What's To Like About National Broadband

First, a disclaimer. I "call 'em as I see 'em." I've had a number of conversations with National

Broadband personnel. What I've learned in those conversations, now fully on the record (I was somewhat embargoed when I first learned of National Broadband in March 2003 during their "soft launch" at WISPCON III in Chicago) doesn't appear to completely mesh with what National Broadband is saying publicly - in public presentations and its web page. So, the following is written from MY perspective of what I understand of National Broadband's strategy and ultimate prospects.

National Broadband was founded, apparently in equal measure, on a shrewd purchase of fiber capacity, and in-depth knowledge of what Broadband Wireless Internet Access systems are capable of. The fiber capacity purchase was shrewd timing; a relatively modest-cost purchase of fiber pair on WilTel's (<http://www.wiltelcommunications.com>) semi-national (there are a number of states where WilTel does not have a presence) network during the time that WilTel was in or just emerging from "restructuring"... National Broadband had money, and WilTel needed money, so a deal was struck. The knowledge of BWIA came from James (Jim) Selby who, with a lot of help, built a much-admired BWIA network in Aspen, CO that included free 802.11b/Wi-Fi Internet Access throughout much of downtown Aspen.

National Broadband's overall strategy is to add BWIA equipment at selected Fiber Regeneration Huts and "Metropolitan Centers" to distribute Broadband Internet Access to communities that were previously underserved for Broadband Internet Access, or to deliver Broadband Internet Access at very aggressive pricing.

In general concept, National Broadband's strategy is workable and cost-efficient. If it could embody Isenberg's Stupid Network principles, National Broadband could leverage its relatively low costs of fiber distribution to "raise the bar" and offer Broadband Wireless Internet Access at cost/performance ratios that other Broadband service providers cannot touch. I was told that National Broadband's pricing would be as aggressive as \$100/month/Mbps. Internet Service Providers will recognize that this is a startling price point considering that in non-urban areas, a T-1 line (1.544 Mbps) can easily cost \$1200/month. At such prices, National Broadband or a reseller could easily begin to offer Internet connectivity of 10 Mbps or faster. Distribution of such high-speed connectivity is now relatively easy with current generations of Broadband Wireless Internet Access systems.

### Part 3 - What's Wrong With National Broadband

As much as there is to admire about National Broadband, there are number of troubling aspects; enough so to cause serious concern as to whether National Broadband is truly a credible effort and whether it will be able to harness their funding, energy, and window of opportunity to be viable in the long term.

National Broadband's most fundamental flaw is that it is, at heart, NOT a Stupid Network. Because of the realities of investment funding, "big names" were needed as a "comfort factor" for investors. A spinout of Intel, with ongoing Intel backing, Tarari's (<http://www.tarari.com>) "Content Processors" will be installed at each National Broadband Point of Presence (POP) and be an integral part of National Broadband's network. The Content Processors are in essence acceleration systems to speed up network operations such as Secure Sockets Layer authentication, eXtensive Markup Language (XML) processing, and other such processor-intensive tasks. Microsoft added its name as "investor comfort", but its actual level of involvement in National Broadband is unclear. Microsoft was mentioned prominently in National Broadband's debut keynote speech at Broadband Wireless World 2003, but there is only passing mention of Microsoft on National Broadband's web page. In talking with National Broadband personnel, I received conflicting accounts regarding Microsoft's involvement. What I was told is that Microsoft content such as "Microsoft Update" images will be hosted on IBM Servers (rounding out the trio of big names / investor comfort) located at each National Broadband Point of Presence (POP), so that Microsoft customers connecting to the Internet via National Broadband will receive their "Microsoft Update" sourced locally, instead of that content traversing National Broadband's backbone. Tarari's, Microsoft's, and IBM's involvement in National Broadband is not gratuitous. National Broadband has a problem - their fiber network speed is 1 Gbps, and if their services prove to be popular, they could quite conceivably saturate their backbone. The Content Processors and "Microsoft Caching" (curiously, no content caching, such as Akamai, has been mentioned to date by National Broadband) will help stave off potential saturation - to some degree.





